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ON RANDOM EXCHANGE-STABLE MATCHINGS
BORIS PITTEL
Abstract. Consider the group of n men and n women, each with
their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The sta-
ble marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man,
woman) prefer each other to their partners in the matching. Its non-
bipartite version, with an even number n of members, is known as the
stable roommates problem. Jose Alcalde introduced an alternative no-
tion of exchange-stable, one-sided, matching: no two members prefer
each other’s partners to their own partners in the matching. Kata-
rina Cechla´rova´ and David Manlove showed that the e-stable match-
ing decision problem is NP -complete for both types of matchings. We
prove that the expected number of e-stable matchings is asymptotic to(
pin
2
)1/2
for two-sided case, and to e1/2 for one-sided case. However,
the standard deviation of this number exceeds 1.13n, (1.06n resp.). As
an obvious byproduct, there exist instances of preference lists with at
least 1.13n (1.06n resp.) e-stable matchings. The probability that there
is no matching which is stable and e-stable is at least 1 − e−n
1/6+o(1)
,
(1−O(2−n/2) resp.).
1. Introduction and main results
Consider the group of n men and n women, each member each with their
own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is
a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man,woman) prefer each
other to their partners in the matching. A classic theorem, due to David
Gale and Lloyd Shapley [6], asserts that, given any system of preferences
there exists at least one stable marriage M . The proof of this fundamental
theorem was based on analysis of a proposal algorithm: at each step, the
men not currently on hold each make a proposal to their best choice among
women who haven’t rejected them before, and the chosen woman either pro-
visionally puts the man on hold or rejects him, based on comparison of him
to her current suitor if she has one already. The process terminates once
every woman has a suitor, and the resulting bijection turns out to be stable.
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Of course, the roles can be reversed. In general, the two resulting match-
ings, M1 and M2 are different, one men-optimal/women-pessimal, another
women-optimal/men-pessimal. The interested reader is encouraged to con-
sult Dan Gusfield and Rob Irving [7] for a masterful, detailed analysis of
the algebraic (lattice) structure of stable matchings set, and a collection of
proposal algorithms for determination of the stable matchings in between
the two extremal matchings M1 and M2.
A decade after the Gale-Shapley paper, McVitie and Wilson [14] devel-
oped an alternative, sequential, algorithm in which proposals by one side to
another are made one at a time. This procedure delivers the same matching
as the Gale-Shapley algorithm; the overall number of proposals made, say
by men to women, is clearly the total rank of the women in the terminal
matching.
This purely combinatorial, numbers-free, description calls for a proba-
bilistic analysis of the problem chosen uniformly at random among all the
instances of preference lists, whose total number is (n!)2n. In a pioneering
paper [27] Wilson reduced the work of the sequential algorithm to a clas-
sic urn scheme (coupon-collector problem) and proved that the expected
running time, whence the expected total rank of wives in the man-optimal
matching, is at most nHn ∼ n log n, Hn =
∑n
j=1 1/j.
Few years later Don Knuth [10], among other results, found that, in fact,
the expected running time is asymptotic to n log n, and also that the worst-
case running time is O(n2), attributing the latter to an unpublished work
by J. Bulnes and J. Valdes. He also posed a series of open problems, one
of them on the expected number of the stable matchings. Don pointed out
that an answer might be found via his formula for the probability P (n) that
a generic matching M is stable:
(1.1) P (n) =
2n︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
· · ·
∫
x,y∈[0,1]n
∏
1≤i 6=j≤n
(1− xiyj) dxdy.
And then the expected value of Sn, the total number of stable matchings,
would then be determined from E[Sn] = n!P (n).
Following Don Knuth’s suggestion, in [19] we used the equation (1.1) to
obtain an asymptotic formula P (n) ∼ e
−1n logn
n! , which implied that E[Sn] ∼
e−1n log n. We also found the integral formulas for Pk(n) (Pℓ(n) resp.)
the probability that the generic matching M is stable and that the total
man-rank R(M) (the total woman-rank Q(M) is ℓ resp.). These integral
formulas implied that with high probability (w.h.p. from now) for each
stable matching M the ranks R(M), Q(M) are between (1 + o(1))n log n
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and (1 + o(1))n2/ log n. It followed, with some work, that w.h.p. R(M1) ∼
n2/ log n, Q(M1) ∼ n log n and R(M2) ∼ n log n, Q(M2) ∼ n
2/ log n. In
particular, w.h.p. R(Mj)Q(Mj) ∼ n
3, (j = 1, 2).
Spurred by these results, in [20] we studied the likely behavior of the full
random set {(R(M), Q(M))}, whereM runs through all stable matchings for
the random instance of preferences. We proved a law of hyperbola: for every
λ ∈ (0, 1/4), quite surely (q.s) maxM |n
−3Q(M)R(M) − 1| ≤ n−λ; “quite
surely” means with probability 1−O(n−K), for everyK, a notion introduced
by Knuth, Motwani and the author [11]. Furthermore, q.s. Sn ≥ n
1/2−o(1), a
significant improvement of the logarithmic bound in [11], but still far below
n log n, the asymptotic order of E[Sn].
Thus, for a large number of participants, a typical instance of the prefer-
ence lists has multiple stable matchings very nearly obeying the preservation
law for the product of the total man-rank and the total woman-rank.
Eight years ago with Craig Lennon [12] we extended the techniques in [19],
[20] to show that E[S2n] ∼ (e
−2 + 0.5e−3)(n log n)2. Combined with E[Sn] ∼
e−1n log n, this result implied that Sn is of order n log n with probability
0.84, at least.
A recent breakthrough study of the stable matchings in unbalanced set-
tings by Itai Ashlagi, Yash Kanoria and Jacob Leshno [3] (see our follow-up
analysis in [21]) proves that the probabilistic aspects of this classic combina-
torial scheme continue to be a goldmine of interesting problems. In fact, the
recent monograph by David Manlove [15] covers an astonishing variety of
new matching models and algorithms, making some of them ripe for prob-
abilistic study as well. In particular, David discussed an alternative notion
of stability suggested by Jose Alcalde [1]: a matching M is called exchange-
stable (e-stable), if no two members prefer each other’s partners to their own
partners under M . Actually, Jose dealt with the one-sided matchings, so
called roommates assignment problem, but the notion of e-stability makes
sense for two-sided matchings as well.
Somehow, this elegant scheme reminded the author of the stochastic
model [17] (see also our appendix to Michael L. Tsetlin’s book [26]). In
that model a randomly chosen pair of city dwellers, currently housed in the
residential areas j1 and j2, and employed by the plants i1 and i2, exchange
their residencies with probability π(ti1,j1)π(ti2,j2), ti,j being the commute
time from j to i, and π(t) monotone increasing with t. For the large total
population n, the limiting matrix of the numbers xi,j of persons working
in the i-th plant and living in the jt-th residential district maximizes the
weighted entropy
∑
i,j xi,j log
νi,j
xi,j
subject to the row and column constraints.
The numbers νi,j = (ai/π(ti,j))/(
∑
k 1/π(ti,k)), ai being the total roster of
the plant i, can be interpreted as an ideal allocation of n members among
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the residential areas, when they do not have to compete for the limited
capacities of the residential areas.
Katarina Cechla´rova´ and David Manlove [4] showed that, in sharp con-
trast to the classic stable matchings, the e-stable matching decision problem
is NP -complete for both types of matchings. (It is a good place to men-
tion that the “fundamental proposal algorithm” constructed by Rob Irving
for the one-sided stable matchings has O(n2) worst-case running time, [7].)
This surprising result in [4] prodded us to look at the likely behavior of the
e-stable matchings.
We prove that the expected number of e-stable matchings is asymptotic
to
(
πn
2
)1/2
, definitely smaller than e−1n log n for the classic stable match-
ings [18], but in the same league qualitatively. Somehow we felt that the
second moment of the number of e-stable matchings would grow like nγ ,
for some γ ≥ 1 of course. That has been the case so far with the stable
matchings, bipartite and non-bipartite, and also the stable partitions intro-
duced and studied, algorithmically, by Jimmy Tan [24], [25]; see [22] for the
probabilistic results.
However, as a possible reflection of substantial algorithmic complexity
of Alcalde’s model, this second order moment exceeds 1.28n, i.e. grows
exponentially fast. Consequently the standard deviation of the number of
e-stable matchings exceeds 1.13n, signaling that the discernible right tail
of the distribution of that number is much longer than the left tail. As
an obvious byproduct, we claim existence of preference lists with at least
1.13n e-stable matchings. Similar bounds for the stable marriages have long
been known, see [15], Section 2.2.2, for discussion and references. However
those bounds were obtained via explicit constructions of the preference lists
having exponentially many stable matchings. By the very nature of the
probabilistic method we use, our claim is purely existential.
We also consider the one-sided e-stable matchings on the set of n (even)
members, under the assumption that the instance of n preference lists, each
with n−1 positions, is chosen uniformly at random among all [(n−1)!]n such
instances. We had proved that the expected value of the number of the one-
sided stable matchings converges to the finite e1/2 , and that the standard
deviation of this number is ∼
(
πn
4e
)1/4
, approaching infinity moderately fast.
In this paper we show that the expected value of the number of the e-stable,
one-sided matchings, is exactly the same, so is e1/2 in the limit. However,
its standard deviation is exponentially large, 1.06n at least, in qualitative
harmony with the two-sided e-stable matchings. Can the overwhelming
“asymmetry” of the distribution of the number of e-stable matchings be a
hint that, with probability approaching 1, at least one such matching exists?
“Overwhelming” is a key word here: for the classic stable matching problem,
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when the standard deviation is of order n1/4 only, the limiting probability
that a solution exists is below 0.5e1/2 < 1, [8].
We show that q.s. uniformly for every e-stable matching M , two-sided
or one-sided, the arithmetic average of the partners’ ranks is asymptotic to
n1/2, just like the stable one-sided matchings on [n], [20].
Katarina Cechla´rova´ and David Manlove [4], Rob Irving [9], Eric Mc-
Dermid, Christine Cheng and Ichiro Suzuki [13] studied matchings that are
doubly stable, i.e. both classically stable and (coalition)-exchange-stable.
We are back to e-stability when coalition size is 2 only. It was proved in
[4] that, for unrestricted coalition size, a doubly stable marriage exists only
if a stable marriage is unique. Strikingly, a two-sided instance does not
necessarily admit a stable matching which is simply man-exchange stable,
[9]. We prove that this kind of incompatibility holds for almost all large-size
instances of two-sided and one-sided preference lists. More precisely, the
probability that there is no doubly stable matching is at least 1− e−n
1/6−o(1)
(two-sided case), and 1−O(2−n/2) (one-sided case).
2. Basic identities and bounds
2.1. Two-sided matchings. Consider an instance of the n-men/n-women
matching problem under preferences chosen uniformly at random among all
(n!)2n such instances. We need to derive the integral (Knuth-type) formulas
for P(M) the probability that a matching M is exchange-stable (e-stable),
P(M) the probability that M is both e-stable and stable, and P(M1,M2)
the probability that two matchings M1 6=M2 are each e-stable. It is conve-
nient to view M as a bijection from, say, the men set to the women set.
Observe that the uniformly random instance of the 2n preference lists can
be generated as follows. Introduce two n× n arrays of the 2n2 independent
random variables, Xi,j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n) and Yi,j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ n), each dis-
tributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Assume that each man i (woman j resp.) ranks
the women (men resp.) in increasing order of the variables Xi,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
(Yℓ,j, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n). Each of the resulting 2n orderings is uniform, and all the
orderings are independent.
Lemma 2.1. Let (a, b) stand for a generic, unordered, pair of distinct ele-
ments of [n]. Then, for every matching M ,
(2.1)
P(M) =

∫ · · · ∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b)
(1− xaxb) dx


2
,
P(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x,y∈[0,1]n
P(M |x,y) dxdy,
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where
(2.2)
P(M |x,y) =
∏
(i1,i2)
P
({
Xi1,M(i2) < xi1 , Yi1,M(i2) < yM(i2)
}c
∩
{
Xi2,M(i1) < xi2 , Yi2,M(i1) < yM(i1)
}c
∩
{
Xi1,M(i2) < xi1 , Xi2,M(i1) < xi2
}c
∩
{
Yi1,M(i2) < yM(i2), Yi2,M(i1) < yM(i1)
}c)
.
Proof. M is e-stable if and only if we have
∀ (i1, i2), Xi1,M(i1) > Xi1,M(i2) =⇒ Xi2,M(i2) < Xi2,M(i1),
∀ (j1, j2), YM−1(j1),j1 > YM−1(j2),j1 =⇒ YM−1(j2),j2 < YM−1(j1),j2 .
We can say that a pair of men (i1, i2) (a pair of women (j1, j2) resp.) blocks
the matching M , i.e. prevents M from being e-stable, if Xi1,M(i1) >
Xi1,M(i2), Xi2,M(i2) > Xi2,M(i1) (if YM−1(j1),j1 > YM−1(j2),j1 , YM−1(j2),j2 >
YM−1(j1),j2 resp.). So M is e-stable if no two men block M and no two
women block M .
By independence of the matrices {Xi,j} and {Yi,j}, the
(n
2
)
first-line events
and the
(n
2
)
second-line events are collectively independent. Furthermore,
conditioned on {Xi,M(i) = xi, i ∈ [n]} (on {YM−1(j),j = yj, j ∈ [n]} resp.)
the
(
n
2
)
events in the first (second resp.) line are independent among them-
selves. Therefore
(2.3)
P
(
M is e-stable |Xi,M(i) = xi, YM−1(j),j = yj, i, j ∈ [n]
)
=
∏
(i1,i2)
P
({
Xi1,M(i2) < xi1 , Xi2,M(i1) < xi2
}c)
·
∏
(j1,j2)
P
({
YM−1(j2),j1 < yj1 , YM−1(j1),j2 < yj2
}c)
=
∏
(i1,i2)
(
1− xi1xi2
)
·
∏
(j1,j2)
(
1− yj1yj2
)
.
Integrating both sides for x, y ∈ [0, 1]n we obtain the top formula in (2.1).
The proof of the bottom formula is similar, as P(M |x,y) is the probability
that M is e-stable and stable, conditioned on {Xi,M(i) = xi, YM−1(j),j =
yj, i, j ∈ [n]}. Of course,
(2.4) P(M |x,y) ≤
∏
(i1,i2)
(
1− xi1xi2
)
·
∏
(j1,j2)
(
1− yj1yj2
)
.

Next, introduce Q(M) and R(M), the total sum of all wives’ ranks and
the total sum of all husbands’ ranks on the preference lists of their spouses
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under matching M . Using χ(A) to denote the indicator of an event A, we
have
Q(M) = n+
∑
i,j 6=M(i)
χ
(
Xi,j < Xi,M(i)
)
= n+
∑
{i1, i2}
χ
(
Xi1,M(i2) < Xi1,M(i1)
)
= n+
∑
(i1,i2)
[
χ
(
Xi1,M(i2) < Xi1,M(i1)
)
+ χ
(
Xi2,M(i1) < Xi2,M(i2)
)]
,
and likewise
R(M) = n+
∑
(j1,j2)
[
χ
(
YM−1(j2),j1 < YM−1(j1),j1
)
+ χ
(
YM−1(j1),j2 < YM−1(j2),j2
)]
.
For n ≤ k, ℓ ≤ n2, let Pk,ℓ(M) := P(M is e-stable, Q(M) = k,R(M) = ℓ).
Lemma 2.2. Using notation z¯ = 1− z,
(2.5)
Pk,ℓ(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
[ξk−n]
∏
(a,b)
(
x¯ax¯b + ξxax¯b + ξx¯axb
)
dx
×
∫
· · ·
∫
y∈[0,1]n
[ηℓ−n]
∏
(c,d)
(
y¯cy¯d + ηycy¯d + ηy¯cyd
)
dy.
Thus Pk,ℓ(M) does not depend on M .
Proof. First of all, we have
Pk,ℓ(M) = [ξ
kηℓ] E
[
ξQ(M)ηR(M)χ(M is e-stable)
]
,
χ
(
M is e-stable
)
=
∏
(i1,i2)
χ
({
Xi1,M(i2) < Xi1,M(i1), Xi2,M(i1) < Xi2,M(i2)
}c)
×
∏
(j1,j2)
χ
({
YM−1(j2),j1 < YM−1(j1),j1 , YM−1(j1),j2 < YM−1(j2),j2
}c)
.
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So, conditioning on {Xi,M(i)}i∈[n] = x and {YM−1(j),j}j∈[n] = y respectively,
we have
E
[
ξQ(M)
∏
(i1,i2)
χ
({
Xi1,M(i2) < Xi1,M(i1), Xi2,M(i1) < Xi2,M(i2)
}c)∣∣∣ x]
= ξn
∏
(i1,i2)
E
[
ξχ
(
Xi1,M(i2)<xi1
)
+χ
(
Xi2,M(i1)<xi2
)
· χ
(
{Xi1,M(i2) < xi1 , Xi2,M(i1) < xi2}
c
)]
= ξn
∏
(i1,i2)
(
x¯i1 x¯i2 + ξxi1 x¯i2 + ξx¯i1xi2
)
,
as P(Xi1,M(i2) < xi1) = xi1 and P(Xi2,M(i1) < xi2) = xi2 . Likewise
E
[
ηR(M)
∏
(i1,i2)
χ
({
YM−1(j2),j1 < YM−1(j1),j1 , YM−1(j1),j2 < YM−1(j2),j2
}c)∣∣∣ y]
= ηn
∏
(j1,j2)
(
y¯j1 y¯j2 + ηyj1 y¯j2 + ηy¯j1yj2
)
.
Integrating the two conditional expectations over x ∈ [0, 1]n and y ∈ [0, 1]n
respectively, and multiplying the integrals, we obtain
E
[
ξQ(M)ηR(M)χ(M is e-stable)
]
= ξn
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b)
(
x¯ax¯b + ξxax¯b + ξx¯axb
)
dx
× ηn
∫
· · ·
∫
y∈[0,1]n
∏
(c,d)
(
y¯cy¯d + ηycy¯d + ηy¯cyd
)
dy.
This identity is equivalent to (2.5). 
Let M1 6=M2 be two generic matchings. Together M1 and M2 determine
a bipartite graph G(M1,M2) on the vertex set [n] × [n], with the edge set
E formed by the man-woman pairs (i, j) ∈ M1 ∪M2. Each component of
G(M1,M2) is either an edge e ∈M1∩M2, or a vertex-wise alternating circuit
of even length at least 4, in which the edges from M1 and M2 alternate
as well. So the edge set for all these circuits is the symmetric difference
M1∆M2. The vertex set V (M1∆M2) is the union of the men set N and the
women set N ′, where |N | = |N ′| =: ν, and
I := N c = {i :M1(i) =M2(i)}, J := (N
′)c = {j :M−11 (j) =M
−1
2 (j)};
i ∈ I iff j ∈ J , where j is the common value of M1(i), M2(i).
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Lemma 2.3. Denoting x1 = {xi,1 : i ∈ [n]}, x2 = {xi,2 : i ∈ [n]}, xi,1 =
xi,2 for i ∈ I, and x
∗
2 = {xi,2 : i ∈ N}, we have
P (M1,M2) ≥

 ∫ · · · ∫
x1∈[0,1]n, x∗2∈[0,1]
ν
f(x1,x2) dx1dx
∗
2


2
,
f(x1,x2) =
∏
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈N
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
×
∏
i1∈I, i2∈N
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
×
∏
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈I
(
1− xi1,1xi2,1
)
.
Proof. We need to characterize e-stability of the matchings M1 and M2
in terms of the matrices {Xi,j} and {Yi,j}. Observe first that Xi,M1(i) =
Xi,M2(i) for i ∈ I and YM−11 (j),j
= YM−12 (j).j
for j ∈ J .
The matchings M1 and M2 are both e-stable if and only if none of the
pairs of men (i1, i2) and none of the pairs of women (j1, j2) blocks either M1
or M2. Introduce the events
A(i1,i2) =
{
(i1, i2) blocks neither M1 nor M2
}
,
B(j1,j2) =
{
(j1, j2) blocks neither M1 nor M2
}
.
The
(n
2
)
events A(i1,i2) are independent of the
(n
2
)
events B(j1,j2). Further-
more, conditioned on the values Xi,M1(i) = xi,1, Xi,M2(i) = xi,2, so that
xi,1 = xi,2 for i ∈ I (YM−11 (j),j
= yj,1, YM−12 (j),j
= yj,2 so that yj,1 = yj,2
for j ∈ J resp.), the events A(i1,i2) (B(j1,j2) resp.) are independent among
themselves. Introducing (in addition to x1, x2, x
∗
2) the vectors y1 = {yj,1 :
j ∈ [n]}, y2 = {yj,2 : j ∈ [n]} and y
∗
2 = {yj,2 : j ∈ N
′}, we have
(2.6)
P
(
M1,M2 are e-stable |x1,x2,y1,y2
)
=
∏
(i1,i2)
P
(
A(i1,i2)|x1,x2
)
·
∏
(j1,j2)
P
(
B(j1,j2)|y1,y2
)
.
Consider P
(
A(i1,i2)|x1,x2
)
.
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(1) M1(i1) 6=M2(i1), M1(i2) 6=M2(i2). Then
P
(
A(i1,i2)|x1,x2
)
= 1− P
(
Xi1,M1(i2) < xi1,1, Xi2,M1(i1) < xi2,1
)
− P
(
Xi1,M2(i2) < xi1,2, Xi2,M2(i1) < xi2,2
)
+ P
(
{Xi1,M1(i2) < xi1,1, Xi2,M1(i1) < xi2,1}
and {Xi1,M2(i2) < xi1,2, Xi2,M2(i1) < xi2,2}
)
= 1− xi1,1 xi2,1 − xi1,2 xi2,2 + xi1,1xi1,2 · xi2,1xi2,2
=
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
.
(2) M1(i1) =M2(i1), M1(i2) 6=M2(i2). In this case xi1,1 = xi1,2, and
Xi2,M1(i1) < xi2,1, Xi2,M2(i1) < xi2,2 ⇐⇒ Xi2,M1(i1) < xi2,1 ∧ xi2,2,
and therefore
P
(
A(i1,i2)|x1,x2
)
= 1− xi1,1 xi2,1 − xi1,2 xi2,2 + xi1,1xi1,2 (xi2,1 ∧ xi2,2)
≥
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
.
(3) Finally, if M1(i1) =M2(i1), M1(i2) =M2(i2), then
P
(
A(i1,i2)|x1,x2
)
= 1− xi1,1 xi2,1 − xi1,2 xi2,2 + (xi1,1 ∧ xi1,2) (xi2,1 ∧ xi2,2)
= 1− xi1,1 xi2,1.
Therefore
(2.7)
∏
(i1,i2)
P
(
A(i1,i2)|x1,x2
)
≥
∏
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈N
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
×
∏
i1∈I, i2∈N
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
×
∏
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈I
(
1− xi1,1xi2,1
)
.
Similarly
(2.8)
∏
(j1,j2)
P
(
B(j1,j2)|y1,y2
)
≥
∏
(j1,j2): j1,j2∈N ′
(
1− yj1,1 yj2,1
)(
1− yj1,2 yj2,2
)
×
∏
j1∈J, j2∈N ′
(
1− yj1,1 yj2,1
)(
1− yj1,2 yj2,2
)
×
∏
(j1,j2): j1,j2∈J
(
1− yj1,1yj2,1
)
.
Plugging the formulas (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.6), integrating over x1,
x∗2, y1, y
∗
2, and using |N | = |N
′|, |I| = |J |, we complete the proof. 
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The integral identities in Lemma 2.3, Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 turn
out quite amenable to a sharp asymptotic analysis.
2.2. One-sided matchings. Consider an instance of the one-sided match-
ing problem on the set [n], n even, chosen uniformly at random from among
all ((n − 1)!n such instances. Let P(M) be the probability that a generic
matching M e-stable, and let P(M1,M2) the probability that two generic
matchings M1 6= M2 are both e-stable. In addition, introduce P(M) the
probability that M is doubly stable, i.e. both exchange-stable and stable.
Like two-sided case, the uniformly random instance of the n preference
lists can be generated as follows. Introduce the array of n(n − 1) indepen-
dent, [0, 1]-Uniforms Xi,j (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n) and Yi,j (1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n), each
distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Assume that each member i ranks other
members in increasing order of the variables Xi,k, k 6= i. Each of the result-
ing n preference lists is uniform, and all the lists are independent.
Lemma 2.4. For every matching M ,
(2.9)
P(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(1− xaxb) dx,
P(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(1− xaxb)
2 dx.
Note. The top integral in (2.9) also equals the probability that M is
stable.
Next, introduce R(M), the sum of all partners’ ranks under matching M .
We have
R(M) = (n− 1) +
∑
i,j 6=M(i)
χ
(
Xi,j < Xi,M(i)
)
= (n− 1) +
∑
(i1,i2)
[
χ
(
Xi1,M(i2) < Xi1,M(i1)
)
+ χ
(
Xi2,M(i1) < Xi2,M(i2)
)]
.
For n− 1 ≤ k, ℓ ≤ n(n− 1), let Pk(M) := P(M is e-stable, R(M) = k).
Lemma 2.5. Using notation z¯ = 1− z,
(2.10)
Pk(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
[ξk−(n−1)]
∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(
x¯ax¯b + ξxax¯b + ξx¯axb
)
dx.
Thus Pk(M) does not depend on M .
LetM1 6=M2 be two generic matchings. Together, M1 andM2 determine
a graph G(M1,M2) on the vertex set [n], with the edge set E formed by
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the man-woman pairs (i, j) ∈ M1 ∪ M2. Each component of G(M1,M2)
is either an edge e ∈ M1 ∩M2, or a circuit of even length at least 4, in
which the edges from M1 and M2 alternate. So the edge set for all these
circuits is the symmetric difference M1∆M2. Let N = N (M1,M2) denote
the vertex set of M1∆M2, and ν = ν(M1,M2) := |N |. Then I = N
c is
{i ∈ [n] : M1(i) =M2(i)}, |I| = n− ν.
Lemma 2.6. Denoting x1 = {xi,1 : i ∈ [n]}, x2 = {xi,2 : i ∈ [n]}, xi,1 =
xi,2 for i ∈ I, and x
∗
2 = {xi,2 : i ∈ N}, we have
P (M1,M2) ≥
∫
· · ·
∫
x1∈[0,1]n, x∗2∈[0,1]
ν
f(x1,x2) dx1dx
∗
2,
with f(x1,x2) defined in Lemma 2.3.
The proofs are a shorter version of those for the two-sided matchings.
3. Estimates of the integrals
Notations. We will write An ⋖ Bn as a shorthand for “An = O(Bn),
uniformly over parameters that determine An, Bn”, when the expression for
Bn is uncomfortably bulky for an argument of the big-O notation.
In [22] we proved that, uniformly for all matchings M on [m], (m even),
(3.1)
∏
(i1,i2 6=M(i1))
(1− xi1xi2)⋖ exp
(
−
s2
2
)
, s :=
∑
i∈[m]
xi,
Only minor modification is needed to prove that
(3.2)
∏
(i1,i2 6=i1)
(1− xi1xi2)⋖ exp
(
−
s2
2
)
, s :=
∑
i∈[m]
xi,
The bounds (3.1) and (3.1) will be instrumental in this paper as well. An-
other key tool is the following claim, [18], [20].
Lemma 3.1. Let X1, . . . ,Xν be independent [0, 1]-Uniforms. Let S =∑
i∈[ν]Xi and V = {Vi = Xi/S; i ∈ [ν]}, so that
∑
i∈[ν] Vi = 1. Let
L = {Li; i ∈ [ν]} be the set of lengths of the ν consecutive subintervals
of [0, 1] obtained by selecting, independently and uniformly at random, ν− 1
points in [0, 1]. Then the joint density fS,V(s,v), (v = (v1, . . . , vν−1)), of
(S, V ) is given by
(3.3)
fS,V(s,v) = s
ν−1χ
(
max
i∈[ν]
vi ≤ s
−1
)
χ(v1 + · · ·+ vν−1 ≤ 1)
≤
sν−1
(ν − 1)!
fL(v), vν := 1−
ν−1∑
i=1
vi;
here fL(v) = (ν− 1)!χ(v1+ · · ·+ vν−1 ≤ 1) is the density of (L1, . . . , Lν−1).
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We will also use the classic identities, Andrews, Askey and Roy [2], Section
1.8:
(3.4)
ν︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
· · ·
∫
x≥0
x1+···+xν≤1
∏
i∈[ν]
xαii dx =
∏
i∈[ν] αi!
(ν + α)!
, α :=
∑
i∈[ν]
αi,
ν−1︷ ︸︸ ︷∫
· · ·
∫
x≥0
x1+···+xν=1
∏
i∈[ν]
xαii dx1 · · · dxν−1 =
∏
i∈[ν] αi!
(ν − 1 + α)!
.
The identity/bound (3.3) is useful since the random vector L had been well
studied. It is known, for instance, that
(3.5) L
D
≡
{
Wi∑
j∈[ν]Wj
}
i∈[ν]
,
whereWj are independent, exponentially distributed, with the same parame-
ter, Re´nyi [23]. An immediate corollary is that L1, . . . Lν are equidistributed.
We used (3.5) in [22] to prove
Lemma 3.2. Let s ≥ 2. For σ < 1s+1 , we have
(3.6) P
(∣∣∣νs−1
s!
∑
j∈[ν]
Lsj − 1
∣∣∣ ≥ ν−σ
)
≤ exp
(
−Θ(ν
1
s+1
−σ )
)
,
and, for ν even,
(3.7) P
(∣∣∣2ν ∑
j∈[ν/2]
LjLj+ν/2 − 1
∣∣∣ ≥ ν−σ
)
≤ exp
(
−Θ(ν
1
s+1
−σ )
)
.
Note. Had E
[
ezW
2]
been finite for |z| 6= 0 sufficiently small, we would
have been able to prove–via a standard application of Chernoff’s method–a
stronger bound, namely exp
(
−Θ(ν)
)
. And that’s the estimate we claimed
(without a proof) in [19], overlooking that, for the exponentialW , E
[
ezW
2]
=
∞ if z > 0. The weaker, sub-exponential, bounds (3.6), (3.7) were proved
in [22] by combining Chernoff’s method with truncation of W at ν
1
s+1 . It
turned out that these bounds combined with the inequality (3.1), missed
in [19], were all we needed in [22] for the asymptotic study of non-bipartite
stable partitions and matchings. We stressed there that the argument could
be used as a template for swapping some proof steps in the corresponding
parts of [19], [20], [8], and so avoiding the problematic issue of exponential
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bounds. We will see that the sub-exponential bounds (3.6), (3.7) are suffi-
cient for our study in this paper as well.
In addition to the bounds (3.6), we will need
(3.8) P
(
max
j∈[ν]
L
(ν)
j ≥
log2 ν
ν
)
≤ e−Θ(log
2 ν),
which directly follows from
(3.9) P
(
max
j∈[ν]
L
(ν)
j ≥ x
)
≤ ν P
(
L
(ν)
1 ≥ x
)
= ν(1− x)ν−1.
4. Estimates for two-sided matchings
4.1. P(M), E[Sn]. By Lemma 2.1,
(4.1) P (M) = P(M is e-stable) ≡

∫ · · · ∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b)
(1− xaxb) dx


2
.
Here, by (3.2), ∏
(a,b)
(1− xaxb)⋖ exp
(
−
s2
2
)
, s :=
∑
a∈[n]
xa.
So, by Lemma 3.1 and (3.4),
(4.2)
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b)
(1− xaxb) dx⋖
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
s2
2
) sn−1
(n− 1)!
ds ⋖
(n − 2)!!
(n− 1)!
=
1
(n− 1)!!
.
Therefore P(M)⋖
[
(n− 1)!!
]−2
, implying that
E
[
Sn
]
= n! P(M)⋖
n![
(n− 1)!!
]2 = n!!(n− 1)!! = Θ(n1/2).
This bound is qualitatively sharp.
Theorem 4.1.
E
[
Sn
]
=
(
1 +O(n−σ)
)√πn
2
, ∀σ <
1
3
.
The proof consists of two parts: reduction of the integration domain in the
formula (4.1) and sharp estimate of the integral over the core domain.
Note. For comparison: (1) the expected number of the classical, bi-
partite, stable matchings is asymptotic to e−1n log n ≫ n1/2, [18]; (2) its
counterpart for one-sided stable matchings approaches a finite limit e1/2
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[20], and even the expected number of stable partitions, that include stable
matchings as a very special case (Tan [24]), is of order n1/4 [22], again well
below n1/2.
4.1.1. Reduction of the cube [0, 1]n. In steps, we will eliminate the large
chunks of the integration cube so that we will be able to approximate sharply
the integrand on the remaining part of the cube, at the total (relative) error
cost of order e−Θ(log
2 n). Since the argument is very close to, indeed simpler
than, the proof in Section 4.2 in [22], we limit ourselves to describing the
intermediate steps and shedding some light on the proofs.
For the first reduction, we observe that the integrand e−
s2
2 sn−1 in (4.2)
attains its sharply pronounced maximum at (n−1)1/2, and the second order
logarithmic derivative of the integrand is below −1 for all s > 0. Given
C ⊆ [0, 1]n, define
IC(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈C
∏
(a,b)
(1− xaxb) dx,
and set I(M) := I[0,1]n(M).
Lemma 4.2. Let C1 =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]n : s ≤ sn
}
, sn = n
1/2 + 3 log n. Then,
I(M)− IC1(M) ≤
e−Θ(log
2 n)
(n− 1)!!
.
See Lemma 4.5 in [22]. Our next step is to shrink C1 to its subset where
each component xi of x is at most s
log2 n
n .
Lemma 4.3. Let ui :=
xi
s and C2 :=
{
x ∈ C1 : maxi ui ≤
log2 n
n
}
. Then
IC1(M)− IC2(M) ≤
e−Θ(log
2 n)
(n− 1)!!
.
Proof. The proof starts with
IC1(M)− IC2(M)⋖
∫
· · ·
∫
x≥0
e−
s2
2 χ
{
max
i
ui ≥
log2 n
n
}
dx
≤
P
(
maxi∈[n] Li ≥
log2 n
n
)
(n− 1)!
∫ ∞
0
e−
s2
2 sn−1 ds,
see Lemma 3.1, and the probability is then bounded with the help of (3.8).

Notice that
∑
i∈[n] x
4
i = O
(
n−1 log8 n) uniformly for x ∈ C2, which would
have been good enough for us. However, the constraints on C2 guarantee
only that
∑
i∈[n] x
2
i = O
(
log4 n), while we will need to know that only x
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with a bounded
∑
i∈[n] x
2
i matter asymptotically. Thus another reduction of
the integration domain is in order.
Lemma 4.4. Let C3 :=
{
x ∈ C2 :
∣∣∣n2 ∑i u2i − 1∣∣∣ ≤ n−σ}, σ < 1/3. Then
IC3(M)− IC2(M) ≤
e−Θ(n
1/3−σ)
(n− 1)!!
.
The proof combines Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2.
Putting together Lemmas 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 we have
Corollary 4.5.
I(M)− IC3(M) ≤
e−Θ(log
2 n)
(n− 1)!!
,
where the core domain C3 ⊂ [0, 1]
n is defined by the constraints: with sn =
n1/2 + 3 log n,
(4.3) s ≤ sn max
i∈[n]
xi ≤ s
log2 n
n
,
∣∣∣∣∣n
∑
i∈[n] x
2
i
2s2
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ n−σ.
Notice that the constraints (4.3) imply that
(4.4) max
I∈[n]
xi ≤ 2n
−1/2 log2 n→ 0,
meaning that the constraint maxi xi ≤ 1 is superfluous for n large enough.
Furthermore, in combination with 1− z = exp
[
−z− z2/2+O(|z|3)
]
, z → 0,
the inequality (4.4) delivers
∏
(i,j)
(1− xixj) = exp
(
−
∑
(i,j)
(
xixj +
x2i x
2
j
2
)
+O
(∑
i∈[n]
x4i
))
,
the equality that holds uniformly for x ∈ C3, thus with the remainder term
of order O
(
n−1 log8 n
)
. From the constraints (4.3) we infer
Lemma 4.6. Uniformly for x ∈ C3,∏
(i,j)
(1− xixj) = exp
(
−
s2
2
(
1−
2
n
)
−
s4
n2
+O(n−σ)
)
.
4.1.2. Sharp estimate of P (M).
Lemma 4.7.
IC3(M) = cn
1− e−Θ(log
2 n)
(n− 1)!!
, cn =


1, n is even,√
π
2
, n is odd.
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Proof. Denote ψn(s) =
s2
2
(
1 − 2n
)
− s
4
n2
. Applying Lemma 3.1 and using
(4.4), Lemma 4.6, we obtain
IC3(M) =
(
1 +O(n−σ)
)
P
(∣∣∣n
2
∑
i∈[n]
L2i − 1
∣∣∣ ≤ n−σ; max
j∈[n]
Lj ≤
log2 n
n
)
×
1
(n− 1)!
∫ sn
0
e−ψn(s)sn−1 ds.
The probability factor here exceeds 1 − exp(−Θ(log2 n)). The integrand
attains its sharp maximum at sˆ = (n − 1)1/2 − Θ(n−1/2), so that sn −
sˆ ≥ 2 log n. The overwhelming contribution to the integral comes from
s ∈ [sˆ − log n, sˆ + log n], and for those s we have s
4
n2
= 1 + O(n−1/2 log n).
An easy argument shows then that the integral equals
e−1
(
1 +O(n−1/2 log n)
)
(n− 1)!
∫ ∞
0
e−
s2
2 (1−
2
n)sn−1 ds
=
(
1 +O(n−1/2 log n)
)
·
cn
(n− 1)!!
.

Corollary 4.8.
P(M) =

∫ · · · ∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b)
(1− xaxb) dx


2
=
(
1 +O(n−σ)
)( cn
(n− 1)!!
)2
.
By E
[
Sn
]
= n!P (M), and Stirling formula for factorials, Corollary 4.8
completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
4.2. Likely range of the partners’ ranks. Let Rw(M) and Rm(M) stand
for the total wives’ rank and the total husbands’ rank in a generic matching
M . From (2.5), Rw(M) and Rm(M) are equidistributed and, for R(M) =
Rm(M), Rw(M), Pk(M) := P(M is e-stable, R(M) = k) is given by
(4.5)
Pk(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
[ξk−n]
∏
(a,b)
(
x¯ax¯b + ξxax¯b + ξx¯axb
)
dx
×
∫
· · ·
∫
y∈[0,1]n
∏
(c,d)
(
1− ycyd
)
dy.
Theorem 4.9. For a fixed ε ∈ (0, 1),
P
(
max
M
∣∣∣∣R(M)n3/2 − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
)
≤ e−Θ(log
2 n).
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Proof. Introduce k = ⌈(1 + ε)n3/2⌉, and define
P+(M) = P(M is e-stable, R(M) ≥ k).
Applying Chernoff’s method to (4.5), we get
P+(M) ≤ I(k)
∫
· · ·
∫
y∈[0,1]n
∏
(c,d)
(
1− ycyd
)
dy,
I(k) :=
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
inf
ξ≥1
[
ξ−k¯
∏
(a,b)
(
x¯ax¯b + ξxax¯b + ξx¯axb
)]
dx,
k¯ := k−n. By (4.2), the first line integral is of order 1(n−1)!! . As for I(k), in
Theorem 4, [20] (stable matchings on [n], n even), and recently in Theorem
4.16, [22] (stable partitions on [n]) we analyzed similar integrals, where the
products were over the unmatched (unaligned) pairs, while in the present
case the product is over all pairs (a, b) of distinct elements a, b ∈ [n]. Since
in all cases the number of excluded pairs is linear in n, the arguments from
the cited papers work just as well for I(k), and we get
I(k) ≤
e−Θ(log
2 n)
(n− 1)!!
=⇒ P+(M) ≤
e−Θ(log
2 n)
[(n− 1)!!]2
.
Likewise
P−(M) := P
(
M is e-stable, R(M) ≤ (1− ε)n3/2
)
≤
e−Θ(log
2 n)
[(n− 1)!!]2
.
Therefore
P
(
max
M
∣∣∣∣R(M)n3/2 − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
)
≤ n!
e−Θ(log
2 n)
[(n− 1)!!]2
≤ n1/2e−Θ(log
2 n),
which completes the proof of Theorem 4.9. 
4.3. A doubly stable matching is unlikely. Our task is to prove that∑
M P(M) → 0. To bound P(M) we need first to reduce the integration
domain {x,y ∈ [0, 1]n} to a manageable subdomain D∗, such that
n!max
M
[
P(M)− PD∗(M)
]
→ 0.
By (2.4) and the inequality (3.2), we have
P(M |x,y) ⋖ exp
(
−
s2
2
−
t2
2
)
, s :=
∑
i
xi, t :=
∑
i
yi.
Given D, a subset of {x,y ∈ [0, 1]n}, denote
PD(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x,y∈D
P(M |x,y) dxdy.
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Then
PD(M)⋖
∫
· · ·
∫
x,y∈D
exp
(
−
s2
2
−
t2
2
)
dxdy.
Let D1 = {x,y : max(s, t) ≤ 2n
1/2}. Then
P(M) −PD1(M)⋖
∫
· · ·
∫
x≥0
s≥2n1/2
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
dx ·
∫
· · ·
∫
y≥0
exp
(
−
t2
2
)
dy.
The second integral equals 1/(n − 1)!!, and the first integral is of order
ne−2n
(2n1/2)n−1
(n− 1)!
⋖
n(2e−2)n
(n− 1)!!
,
since the integrand attains its maximum at s = 2n1/2. So
(4.6) P(M) − PD1(M)⋖
n(2e−2)n[
(n− 1)!!
]2 .
For the second, last, reduction, define ui =
xi
s , vi =
yi
t and set
D2 =
{
(x,y) ∈ D1 : max
i
ui ≤ n
−γ , max
i
vi ≤ n
−γ
}
,
where γ < 1 is to be chosen later. Then
PD1(M)− PD2(M)⋖
∫
· · ·
∫
x≥0
maxui>n
−γ
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
dx ·
∫
· · ·
∫
y≥0
exp
(
−
t2
2
)
dy.
By Lemma 3.1 and (3.9), the first integral is bounded by
P
(
maxi∈[n]Li ≥ n
−γ
)
(n− 1)!
∫ ∞
0
e−
s2
2 sn−1 ds ≤
e−Θ(n
1−γ )
(n − 1)!!
.
So
(4.7) PD1(M)− PD2(M) ≤
e−Θ(n
1−γ )[
(n− 1)!!
]2 .
Setting D∗ = D2, by (4.6) and (4.7) we have
(4.8) P(M)− PD∗(M) ≤
e−Θ(n
1−γ )[
(n − 1)!!
]2 .
Now that (x,y) ∈ D∗ we can use (2.2) to obtain a sharp upper bound for
P(M |x,y), whence for PD∗(M) the integral of P(M |x,y) over D
∗. First of
all, on D∗ we have xi, yi ≤ 2n
1/2−γ → 0, provided that γ ∈ (1/2, 1).
By Bonferroni inequality
P
(
∩Bcj
)
≤ 1−
∑
j
P(Bj) +
∑
j1<j2
P
(
Bj1 ∩Bj2),
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the (i1, i2)-th factor from the product in (2.2) is at most
(4.9)
F(i1,i2)(x,y) = 1−G(i1,i2)(x,y) +H(i1,i2)(x,y),
G(i1,i2)(x,y) := xi1yM(i2) + xi2yM(i1) + xi1xi2 + yM(i2)yM(i1),
H(i1,i2)(x,y) := 2xi1xi2yM(i1)yM(i2) + xi1xi2
(
yM(i1) + yM(i2)
)
+ yM(i1)yM(i2)
(
xi1 + xi2
)
.
Here G(i1,i2)(x,y), H(i1,i2)(x,y)→ 0 uniformly for all i1, i2 and (x,y) ∈ D
∗,
and more precisely H(i1,i2)(x,y) = O(n
3/2−3γ). So
F(i1,i2)(x,y) ≤
(
1−G(i1,i2)(x,y)
)
eO(n
3/2−3γ )
≤
(
1− xi1xi2
)(
1− yM(i1)yM(i2)
)
×
(
1− xi1yM(i2)
)(
1− xi2yM(i1)
)
eO(n
3/2−3γ ).
Now ∏
(i1,i2)
(
1− xi1xi2
)
⋖ e−
s2
2 ,
∏
(i1,i2)
(
1− yM(i1)yM(i2)
)
⋖ e−
t2
2 ,
∏
(i1,i2)
(
1− xi1yM(i2)
)(
1− xi2yM(i1)
)
≤ exp
(
−
∑
(i1,i2)
(xi1yM(i2) + xi2yM(i1))
)
= exp
(
−st+
∑
i
xiyM(i)
)
≤ e−steO(n
2−2γ ).
Therefore, uniformly for (x,y) ∈ D∗, we have
P(M |x,y) ≤ e−
ξ2
2 · eO(n
7/2−3γ ), ξ := s+ t.
Consequently
PD∗(M) ≤ e
O(n7/2−3γ )
∫
· · ·
∫
x,y≥0
e−
ξ2
2 dxdy
= eO(n
7/2−3γ )
∞∫
0
e−
ξ2
2
ξ2n−1
(2n − 1)!
dξ =
eO(n
7/2−3γ )
(2n − 1)!!
.
Combining this estimate with (4.8) we conclude that
P(M) ≤
eO(n
7/2−3γ )
(2n− 1)!!
+
e−Θ(n
1−γ )[
(n− 1)!!
]2 ,
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uniformly for all M . So∑
M
P(M) ≤
eO(n
7/2−3γ )n!
(2n− 1)!!
+
e−Θ(n
1−γ)n![
(n− 1)!!
]2
≤ exp
(
−n log 2 +O(n7/2−3γ)
)
+ e−Θ(n
1−γ)
= e−Θ(n
1−γ ),
provided that γ ∈ (5/6, 1). Thus we have proved
Theorem 4.10. The probability that there exists a matching M , which is
both e-stable and stable, is at most e−n
σ
for every σ < 1/6.
4.4. E
[
S2n
]
and such. Having proved that E
[
Sn
]
is of order n1/2, we felt
confident that— like other types of stable matchings we studied earlier—
the second moment E
[
S2n
]
would not grow faster than nγ , for some γ ≥ 1.
Contrary to our naive expectations, E
[
S2n
]
grows much faster.
For ξ ∈ (0, 1), define
(4.10)
H(ξ) = −(1− ξ) log(1− ξ) + 4ξ log
1 + ξ +
√
1− 2ξ + 5ξ2
1− ξ +
√
1− 2ξ + 5ξ2
− (1 + ξ) log
1 + 3ξ2 + (ξ + 1)
√
1− 2ξ + 5ξ2
1− ξ +
√
1− 2ξ + 5ξ2
.
H(0+) = H(1−) = 0, and H(ξ) attains its maximum at ξmax ≈ 0.739534,
with H(ξmax) ≈ 0.253062.
Using A⋗B as a shorthand for B = O(A), we have
Theorem 4.11. E
[
S2n
]
⋗n3/2 exp[nH(ξmax)] > n
3/21.28n, for n large enough.
Consequently, for each such n there exists an instance of the 2n prefer-
ence lists with the number of e-stable matchings exceeding n3/41.28n/2 >
n3/41.13n.
Thus the standard deviation of Sn is more than 1.13
n, dwarfing E
[
Sn
]
.
Informally, the distribution of Sn is highly asymmetric, with the discernible
right tail much longer than the left tail. It is tempting to conjecture that
P(Sn > 0)→ 1.
To begin the proof, we observe that
(4.11) E
[
(Sn)2
]
=
∑
M1 6=M2
P(M1,M2),
where P(M1,M2) is the probability that bothM1 andM2 are e-stable. The
lower bound for P(M1,M2) given in Lemma 2.3 depends on M1, M2 only
through 2ν := 2ν(M1,M2) the total length of the bipartite circuits formed
by the alternating pairs (man,woman) matched in either M1 or, exclusively,
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in M2. It makes sense to guess that the dominant contribution to the re-
sulting lower bound for the sum in (4.11) comes from the pairs (M1,M2)
with ν(M1,M2) relatively close to some judiciously chosen ν. And since we
are after an exponential bound, we will use a single–ν bound coming from
Lemma 2.3: with x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1]
n, and x∗2 formed by the first ν components
of x2,
(4.12)
E
[
(Sn)2
]
≥ B(n, ν)

 ∫ · · · ∫
x1∈[0,1]n, x∗2∈[0,1]
ν
f(x1,x2) dx1dx
∗
2


2
,
f(x1,x2) =
∏
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈[ν]
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
×
∏
i1∈[ν]c, i2∈[ν]
(
1− xi1,1 xi2,1
)(
1− xi1,2 xi2,2
)
×
∏
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈[ν]c
(
1− xi1,1xi2,1
)
,
where B(n, ν) is the total number of pairs (M1,M2) of general matchings
M1 and M2, with 2ν(M1,M2) = 2ν. More explicitly, we have B(n, ν) =(n
ν
)2
(n − ν)!B(ν). Here B(ν) is the total number of the disjoint unions of
bipartite circuits on the vertex set [ν]∪ [ν], with every second edge on each
circuit marked as belonging to the matching M1, and the intervening edges
being assigned to the matching M2. Thus B(ν) is also the total number
of bipartite permutations of [ν] ∪ [ν] with cycles of length ≥ 4. A simple
bijective argument shows that B(ν) = ν!π(ν), where π(ν) is the total number
of permutations of [ν] without a fixed point. Since π(ν) ∼ e−1ν!, as ν →∞,
it follows that B(ν) = Θ
(
(ν!)2
)
. Therefore
(4.13) E
[
(Sn)2
]
⋗
(n!)2
(n− ν)!

 ∫ · · · ∫
x1∈[0,1]n, x∗2∈[0,1]
ν
f(x1,x2) dx1dx
∗
2


2
.
It remains to find a lower, ν-dependent, bound for the multidimensional
integral, simple enough to identify a value ν = ν(n) that makes the resulting
bound fast approach infinity. We focus on the case when ν and n − ν are
both of order Θ(n).
Similarly to the case of E[Sn], the rest of the proof has two components:
determination of the potentially dominant core C of the integration domain
in (4.13) and a sufficiently sharp, lower, bound of the integral over C.
Motivated by our analysis of E[Sn], and by Corollary 4.5 in particular, we
define C as follows. Define I1 = I2 = [ν], I3 = [n]\[ν], and xi,3 = xi,1(= xi,2)
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for i ∈ I3. Denoting
st =
∑
i∈It
xi,t, s
(2)
t =
∑
i∈It
x2i,t, s =
∑
t
st,
C is the set of all (x1,x2) such that
(4.14) max
i∈It
xi,t ≤ st
log2 n
n
,
s
(2)
t
s2t
≤
3
|It|
, s = Θ(n1/2).
The definition of the range of s will be specified shortly. Let (x1,x
∗
2) ∈ C.
For large n, we have C ⊂ [0, 1]n × [0, 1]ν since xi,t = O
(
n−1/2 log n
)
on C.
This bound on xi,t yields
log
∏
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈It
(
1− xi1,t xi2,t
)
≥ −
∑
(i1,i2): i1,i2∈It
(
xi1,t xi2,t + x
2
i1,t x
2
i2,t
)
≥ −
s2t
2
−
(
s
(2)
t
)2
2
, x ∈ C.
Similarly, for t = 1, 2,
log
∏
i1∈I3, i2∈It
(
1− xi1,t xi2,t
)
≥ −
∑
i1∈I3, i2∈It
(
xi1,t xi2,t + x
2
i1,t x
2
i2,t
)
= −sts3 − s
(2)
t s
(2)
3 .
It follows then from (4.12) that, with s =
∑
t st,
log f(x1,x2) ≥ −
∑
t s
2
t
2
− s1s3 − s2s3 − 1.5
∑
t
(
s
(2)
t
)2
=−
s2
2
+ s1s2 −
∑
t
(
s
(2)
t
)2
≥ −
s2
2
+ s1s2 − 4.5s
2
∑
t
1
|It|
= −
s2
2
+ s1s2 +O(1),
uniformly for n and (x1,x
∗
2) ∈ C. Therefore, for all positive integers k,∫
· · ·
∫
x1∈[0,1]n, x∗2∈[0,1]
ν
f(x1,x2) dx1dx
∗
2 ⋗
∫
· · ·
∫
(x1,x∗2)∈C
exp
(
−
s2
2
+ s1s2
)
dx1dx
∗
2
≥
1
k!
∫
· · ·
∫
(x1,x∗2)∈C
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sk1s
k
2 dx1dx
∗
2.
We will use this bound for k = Θ(n). Let {L
(t)
i }i∈It , (t = 1, 2, 3), denote
the lengths of |It| consecutive intervals obtained by sampling |It| points uni-
formly at random, and independently, from the interval [0, 1]. (The three
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sampling procedures are implemented independently of each other.) Apply-
ing Lemma 3.1, we obtain∫
· · ·
∫
(x1,x∗2)∈C
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sk1s
k
2 dx1dx
∗
2 =
∫∫∫
s=Θ(n1/2)
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sk1s
k
2
×
∏
t
s
|It|−1
t
(|It| − 1)!
P
(
max
i
L
(t)
i ≤ min
{
1
st
,
log2 n
n
}
;
∑
i
(L
(t)
i )
2 ≤
3
|It|
)
ds.
Since st = O
(
n1/2
)
≪ n log−2 n and |It| = Θ(n), the t-th probability factor
is at least
1− exp
(
−Θ(log2 n)
)
− exp
(
−Θ(nγ)
)
,
for γ ∈ (0, 1/3), see Lemma 3.2 and (3.8). Since |I1| = |I2| = ν, |I3| = n−ν,
we see that, with εn := e
−Θ(log2 n),
1
k!
∫
· · ·
∫
(x1,x∗2)∈C
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sk1s
k
2 dx1dx
∗
2
≥ (1− εn)
∫∫∫
s=Θ(n1/2)
exp
(
−
s2
2
) sν+k−11 sν+k−12 sn−ν−13
k!
(
(ν − 1)!
)2
(n− ν − 1)!
ds
=
(1− εn)
(
(ν + k − 1)!
)2
k!
(
(ν − 1)!
)2
(n + ν + 2k − 1)!
∫
s=Θ(n1/2)
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sn+ν+2k−1 ds,
using (3.4) for the last step. The integrand attains its sharply pronounced
maximum at smax = (n+ ν + 2k)
1/2, which is Θ(n1/2) for k = O(n). Let us
choose J := [smax − log n, smax + log n] as the range of s. Since
d2
ds2
log
[
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sn+ν+2k−1
]
≤ −1,
it follows in a standard way (cf. the proof of Lemma 4.7) that
∫
s∈J
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sn+ν+2k−1 ds ≥ (1− εn)
∞∫
0
exp
(
−
s2
2
)
sn+ν+2k−1 ds
≥ (1− εn)(n+ ν + 2k − 1)!!.
Therefore, using(
b
a
)
≤
bb
aa(b− a)b−a
, m! = Θ
[(m
e
)m]
, (m− 1)!! = Θ
[(m
e
)m/2]
,
EXCHANGE STABLE MATCHINGS 25
we obtain
(4.15)
∫
· · ·
∫
x1,x∗2
f(x1,x2) dx1dx
∗
2 ⋗
(
(ν + k − 1)!
)2
k!
(
(ν − 1)!
)2
(n + ν + 2k − 1)!!
⋗ n1/2eH(ν,k),
H(ν, k) := −k log(ke) + 2(ν + k) log(ν + k)− 2ν log ν
−
n+ v + 2k
2
log
n+ ν + 2k
e
.
Treating k as a continuously varying parameter, we have
(4.16) H ′k(ν, k) = 2 log(ν+k)− log k− log(n+ν+2k) = log
(ν + k)2
k(n+ ν + 2k)
.
From (4.16) we see that H(ν, k) has a unique stationary point
k(ν) =
2ν2
n− ν +
√
ν2 + (n− ν)2
= nφ(ξ), ξ :=
ν
n
,
φ(x) :=
2x2
1− x+
√
x2 + (1− x)2
.
So, using (4.16) again,
(4.17)
H(ν, k(ν)) = 2ν log(ν + k(ν))− 2ν log ν −
n+ ν
2
log
n+ ν + 2k(ν)
e
= n
[
2ξ log
(
1 +
φ(ξ)
ξ
)
−
1 + ξ
2
(
log
n
e
+ log(1 + ξ + 2φ(ξ)
)]
.
Since only integers k qualify for the bound (4.15), we introduce k∗(ν) =
⌈k(ν)⌉. As H ′′k (k, ν) = O(n
−1), we have H(ν, k∗(ν)) = H(ν, k(ν))+O(n−1).
For the first factor on the RHS of (4.13) we have
(4.18)
(n!)2
(n− ν)!
⋗ n1/2 exp
[
−(1− ξ) log(1− ξ) + (1 + ξ) log
n
e
]
.
Combining the equations (4.15), (4.17) and (4.18), we obtain
(4.19) E
[
(Sn)2
]
⋗ n3/2 exp
(
nH(ξ)
)
, ξ =
ν
n
,
with H(ξ) defined in (4.10). As a function of the continuously varying
ξ ∈ (0, 1), H(ξ) attains its maximum at ξmax ≈ 0.739534. Introduce ν
∗ =
⌈nξmax⌉; then
ν∗
n = ξmax + O(n
−1), implying that H(ν∗/n) = H(ξmax) +
O(n−1). Therefore
E
[
(Sn)2
]
⋗ n3/2 exp
(
nH(ξmax)
)
.
The proof of Theorem 4.11 is complete.
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5. Estimates for one-sided matchings
5.1. P(M), E[Sn], P(M). By Lemma 2.4,
P(M) = P(M is e-stable) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(1− xaxb) dx.
Let
C∗ =
{
x ∈ C3 :
∣∣∣2n
∑
i∈[n/2] xixi+n/2
s2
− 1
∣∣∣ ≤ n−σ
}
,
where C3 is defined in Corollary 4.5. Very similarly to Lemma 4.6, uniformly
for x ∈ C∗, we have∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(1− xixj) = exp
(
−
s2
2
(
1−
3
n
)
−
s4
n2
+O(n−σ)
)
.
And, just like Corollary 4.5 itself, invoking the bound (3.7) we obtain∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n\C∗
∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(1− xaxb) dx ≤
e−Θ(log
2 n)
(n− 1)!!
.
Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 4.7, and using E[Sn] = (n − 1)!! P(M),
we establish
Theorem 5.1.
P(M) =
(
1 +O(n−σ)
) e1/2
(n− 1)!!
,
E[Sn] = e
1/2 +O(n−σ), ∀σ < 1/3.
Note. Since E[Sn] also equals the expected number of the usual, one-
sided, stable matchings, we actually gave here a corrected proof of our result
from [20]. See the note following Lemma 3.6.
Turn to P(M), the probability that M is both stable and e-stable. By
Lemma 2.4 (3.1), Lemma 3.1 and (3.4),
P(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(1− xaxb)
2 dx
⋖
∫
· · ·
∫
x≥0
e−s
2
dx ≤
∫ ∞
0
e−s
2 sn−1
(n− 1)!
ds
=
2−n/2
(n− 1)!!
Since the total number of matchings on [n] is (n− 1)!!, we have proved
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Theorem 5.2.
P(∃M both stable and e-stable) = O
(
2−n/2
)
.
5.2. Likely range of the partners’s ranks. Let R(M) be the sum of all
partners’s ranks under M , and Pk(M) = P(M is e-stable, R(M) = k). By
Lemma 2.5,
Pk(M) =
∫
· · ·
∫
x∈[0,1]n
[ξk−n+1]
∏
(a,b6=M(a))
(
x¯ax¯b + ξxax¯b + ξx¯axb
)
dx;
this integral is also the probability that M is stable, and R(M) = k.
Theorem 5.3. For a fixed ε ∈ (0, 1),
P
(
max
M
∣∣∣∣R(M)n3/2 − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε
)
≤ e−Θ(log
2 n).
In our recent [22] we proved the similar result for the total rank of “pre-
decessors” in the stable cyclic partitions, that include the stable matchings
as a special case. Since the proof was based on the union bound involving
the distribution of that rank for a generic cyclic partition, Theorem 5.3 is
a direct corollary of that result. The note following Theorem 5.1 could be
replicated here.
5.3. E[S2n] and such.
Theorem 5.4. E
[
S2n
]
⋗ exp
[
n
2H(ξmax)] > 1.13
n, for n large enough. Con-
sequently, for each such n there exists an instance of the n preference lists
with the number of e-stable matchings exceeding 1.06n.
Proof. The one-sided counterpart of (4.12) is
(5.1)
E
[
(Sn)2
]
≥ B(n, ν)
∫
· · ·
∫
x1∈[0,1]n, x∗2∈[0,1]
ν
f(x1,x2) dx1dx
∗
2.
Here B(n, ν) is the total number of pairs (M1,M2) of general matchings
M1 and M2, on [n] with ν(M1,M2), the total length of circuits formed by
the pairs from M1∆M2, equal to ν. More explicitly, we have B(n, ν) =(n
ν
)
(n− ν− 1)!!B(ν). Here B(ν) is the total number of the disjoint unions of
circuits on the vertex set [ν], with every second edge on each circuit marked
as belonging to the matching M1, and the intervening edges being assigned
to the matching M2. Thus B(ν) is also the total number of permutations on
[ν] with cycles of length ≥ 4. Since the total number of those permutations
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with rj cycles of length j ≥ 4 is ν!
∏
j
1
(j!)rj rj !
, it follows easily that
∑
ν≥4
xν
B(ν)
ν!
= exp

 ∑
even j≥4
xj
j

 = e−x22
(1− x2)1/2
.
Using the saddle-point method (Flajolet and Sedgewick [5]), we obtain
B(ν) =
(
1 +O(ν−1)
)
ν!
√
2
πeν
⋗ ν! ν−1/2.
Consequently, for ν = Θ(n),
(5.2) B(n, ν)⋗ exp
[n
2
(
−(1− ξ) log(1− ξ) + (1 + ξ) log
n
e
)]
, ξ :=
ν
n
;
cf. (4.18). Combining the equations (5.1), (4.15), (4.17) and (5.2), we obtain
(5.3) E
[
(Sn)2
]
⋗ n3/2 exp
(n
2
H(ξ)
)
, ξ =
ν
n
,
with H(ξ) defined in (4.10). The rest follows the conclusion of the proof of
Theorem 4.11. 
Acknowledgment. I am grateful to David Manlove for bringing the
existing work on the doubly stable matchings to my attention, and asking
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